A working reading list of the primary sources behind this pitch — the law that created IFCs, the regulators' own data on credit costs and financial inclusion, where institutional capital already sits, and the research on statistical credit scoring the model builds on. Linked to originals; not reproduced here.
First in an ongoing series. External sources below.
The founding statute — "Ley Fintech." Creates the IFC and IFPE license categories, defines debt-based crowdfunding as a regulated financial operation, and sets the CNBV's authority over platform methodology and investor-disclosure standards.
Comunicado No. 68 — Obtención de créditos a través de IFCs↗The regulator's own plain-language explanation of how an IFC operates — matching investor clients with applicant clients through a licensed platform — and what it advises the public to check before using one.
Banxico to bring debt-based crowdfunding under CAT disclosure rules↗Banxico's proposed overhaul of the Costo Anual Total methodology brings IFCs into scope for the first time — the same standardized cost-of-credit disclosure banks and card issuers already follow.
Fintech authorizations under Ley Fintech reach 89↗Sizes the licensed universe: 89 authorized ITFs out of 198 applications since 2018, split across IFPE and IFC categories — still a small fraction (≈4.9%) of multiple-banking-institution capital, which Banxico reads as no systemic risk.
Banxico's semiannual read on system-wide risk. Assesses crowdfunding default rates as an idiosyncratic, investor-level risk rather than a systemic one, given the sector's current scale relative to the banking system.
Encuesta Nacional de Inclusión Financiera (ENIF) 2024 — results↗The national household survey on access to and use of financial products. Roughly eight in ten adults now hold at least one formal financial product — its highest level since 2015 — but formal savings and credit still trail informal alternatives.
Calculadora del Costo Anual Total (CAT)↗The standardized, all-in cost-of-credit metric — rate, fees, and mandatory insurance in one annualized number — used throughout this site's rate-spread comparison and the standard Mexican regulators require for comparing credit products.
Confirms the headroom this fund's LP thesis targets: AFOREs currently allocate 8–9% of assets to CKDs and CERPIs against a 30% regulatory ceiling, with Siefores managing 8.67 trillion pesos (≈24.6% of GDP) in total.
CONSAR loosens single-issuance limits to incentivize AFORE participation↗Raises the cap an individual AFORE can hold in a single CKD/CERPI issuance from 35% to 100% (subject to co-investment rules), explicitly to speed up AFORE participation in productive, mid-market private-credit vehicles.
AFORE investment in productive activity surpasses one trillion pesos↗Breaks down where pension capital already flows through CKDs, CERPIs, and private debt — infrastructure, energy, roads, real estate — the same institutional-allocation pattern this fund is built to plug consumer credit into.
The core case for statistical over judgment-based underwriting: models built on past-borrower data improve accuracy and lower the cost of lending decisions versus a loan officer's subjective read — the premise the fund's own model operationalizes.
Cracking the Credit Code: Alternative Data and AI for Financial Inclusion↗Surveys how alternative data and machine learning extend credit to borrowers thin traditional bureau files miss — case studies across emerging markets, with evidence that data-driven scoring narrows historical gender gaps in access to credit.
Links point to original publishers. Descriptions are summaries in our own words, not excerpts. Sources current as of publication date — regulatory detail (CAT methodology, AFORE allocation limits) is subject to change; verify against the primary source before citing externally.